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Project 16: Sussex Integration of Justice PilotDescription 1. The Sussex Integration of Justice project is a pilot scheme initiated by the Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO) and supported by the Sussex Police, Sussex Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and West and East Sussex Magistrates Courts to demonstrate the feasibility and benefits of system integration across the Criminal Justice System (CJS). The process of dealing with offenders, from arrest to disposal, involves a number of different organisations – the police, the CPS, and the Courts each of which has a need for some or all of the information collected by the others to perform their individual tasks. Currently, this need is met by manual transfer of files between the agencies (and their return if further work or amendments are required). The linking of IT systems in the agencies would make a significant contribution to the elimination of inefficiencies, speed of justice administration, and speed of service to victims and witnesses.2. The overall purpose of the pilot and its subsidiary sets of objectives are set out in the box below – this also identifies the key risks that were anticipated for the project.
Project initiation, design and specification 3. Whilst Greater Manchester Police had been working in Stockport to exchange case information between the police, the Courts and CPS, this was on a relatively small scale, was not linked to the NSPIS products (because they were not yet available), and was not set up as a pilot to test the national benefits of integration. The Sussex Police had also intended to implement strategic IT systems for the administration of justice in co-operation with the local CPS and Courts. But the extent of integration and, most particularly, the early testing of the NSPIS products and of the feasibility and benefits from national level integration were wider strategic purposes for which ISB funding was sought (supported by PITO, the Lord Chancellor’s Department (LCD), and the CPS).4. Project costs and the ISB funded component are presented in Table 1.
5. The scale of the potential benefits if the Sussex pilot proved successful and was applied at national level is demonstrated in the box below.
6. Sussex was selected as the pilot because the Sussex Police were keen to take early delivery of the NSPIS products and had the electronic capacity to do so, because they had a good working relationship with the Sussex CPS and Courts, and because there were plans to introduce/up-grade the latter’s email systems. Although there was a good working relationship between the local partners, it did not seem that there was much of a track-record of joint participation in projects, although PITO at the national level had a history of close networking and joint project work. This could be one of the reasons for the contrast between the relatively informal process that underpinned the formulation of the expression of interest and the bid for ISB funding (involving the national levels of the PITO, LCD, CPS and the Home Office) and the very much more formal systems introduced to initiate and manage the project at the local level in Sussex. 7. One of the other reasons for this contrast was that there was very little time to put the bid together and this did not allow for a formally constituted approach – reliance had to be placed on existing networks and contacts. The pressure of time in the case of project implementation had the opposite effect in terms of the formal arrangements that were introduced in project management, risk assessment, and monitoring to ensure that partners knew exactly what they had to do and by when. Management of the project 8. The project is led by a Project Board chaired by PITO and comprising users (CPS HQ, CJD Sussex, East Sussex Courts, West Sussex Courts, CPS Sussex) and suppliers (Home Office IBIS, LCD, Sussex Police, CPS HQ). The Board meets every 2-3 months as triggered by the scheduled project stages and works to a formal agenda of financial, technical, and progress reports. According to those consulted during the review, the arrangements for directing the project were working very effectively with full and pro-active commitment from the partner organisations. The police were seen to be the lead organisation and this was felt to be justified by their IT experience and their investment in the project. 9. There is a small formal team responsible for the management of the project comprising a project manager, a liaison officer, and project support. The team holds checkpoint meetings every 2-3 weeks in which there is a review of progress against the implementation plan and an assessment of any revisions required to the “risk log” by the extent and nature of progress achieved. “Exception reports” are produced whenever a project component drifts outside acceptable ranges in terms of targets and milestones. The formal project management system (PRINCE 2) is deployed, according to consultees, with rigour but pragmatically rather than mechanistically and, in our assessment, with clear and helpful progress reports.
n Delays in the provision of local email in the CPS; n Delays in the provision of the NSPIS product with respect to case preparation; n Complexities in the local arrangements between the Courts and the CPS were more extensive than originally thought and have adversely affected the implementation of e secure environment for integration; n
Functional
deficiencies were encountered in the prescribed process modelling
tool (PEP) and dialogue is continuing with the suppliers to enhance
product performance.
11.
The revised risk assessment carried out early in 2000 identified
three high risk factors – further delay in the delivery of the NSPIS
products, insufficient funds to complete the required work (Magistrates
Courts), and ineffective connection between the systems. The effect
of the risks and the delays to date would be postponement of complete
integration by nearly 12 months and the use of proxy methods of measurement
of the national benefits (requiring a return to Sussex after the scheduled
end of the project). n Relevant business processes should be modelled and the activities timed and costed before the project starts to provide a more detailed specification of the business case; n The nature of the available technical infrastructure and its inter-dependencies with agencies not party to the project (in this case between the Magistrates’ Courts and the County Council) need to be identified earlier rather than later; n A benefits management strategy should be in place from the very beginning of the project to ensure that all partners are aware of the benefits and the actions necessary to realise them. 13. The monitoring procedures required by PRINCE 2 was used by the project managers at the outset of the project and throughout its implementation to keep them and their partners aware of the main risk factors. However, contingency responses to the risks were severely constrained and it would have made for a better project had these factors been examined in more detail at the outset and more flexibility built into project timing and contingencies. 15. The overall assessment amongst consultees was that project achievements were in line with expectations, that there had been no surprises in terms of cost over-runs, and that the longer term prospects for a successful outcome were now much higher than they were at the outset of the project. Hence, if the project turned out to be successful, then it was thought likely to represent good value for money – but, at this stage, it was too early to offer definitive views on this matter. 16. There was a slight difference of view with respect to the potential for the project to be maintained and extended without further ISB funding. Whilst those most closely involved in the project (at PITO and in the project management team) were very bullish about longer term prospects, some concern was expressed by local partners that the absence of ISB funding and the loss of the project management team would see a decline in commitment to keep the project running at the present level. However, this was clearly dependent on the extent to which it was able to demonstrate both the practicality of integration and the benefits to all parties. If these could be demonstrated, it was likely that the procedures that the project was testing would be mainstreamed and could be extended to other services (e.g. the probation and prison services). 17. Overall, it is our assessment that the project was additional, that it has been conducted effectively, and that its potential outcome is likely to be both innovative and highly positive in terms of increasing the efficiency of the criminal justice system and bringing benefits to witnesses and crime victims. If there is a point of concern, we suggest that it must lie in the proportion of project costs represented by the ISB funding – with only 25% of the total project costs falling on the participating agencies, there are clearly some grounds for the view that the future of the project must be in some doubt if it has to rely on agencies’ funding only.
19. The project was financed through a single pot of money and this did not lead to any insurmountable problems. The main one to have arisen was the extent to which funding from partners could be accounted for in terms of associated contributions to the project and its benefits. This issue was addressed through the formality and rigour of both the Project Board and project management and the detailed accounts provided of cost allocations and activities.20. The main concern on administration and accountability arose because of the combination of a rapid project start (in which insufficient preliminary work could be done on some key project parameters - see paragraph 12) and Treasury monitoring requirements that were described as “light of touch”. The point being made was that, where projects were initiated over a short time-period without a detailed risk assessment, it was particularly important to have robust monitoring requirements in place. The Sussex project had provided for the latter through PRINCE 2 but, had it not done so, there were no other checks and balances in place and there could have been a real risk of the project going off the rails.
22. We think the high proportion of total project costs represented by ISB funding (nearly 75%) had implications for project design, implementation and monitoring. This high proportion clearly brought forward the Sussex project as one that would otherwise have been at the edge of partners’ spending plans or not on their current agenda at all. A number of implications flowed from this: n First, the project had not been through a robust development process prior to the bid for ISB funds. For example, the project design had not appreciated the extent to which the Magistrates’ Courts were constrained in their capacity to link with the CPS and the police by their existing links with the local authority. This meant that the first three months of the project were effectively devoted to project specification and it lead to the request for an extension to the time-scale for the project. n Second, the sums of money devoted to many of the project elements by partners were relatively small and fell below the thresholds that normally prompted their close financial scrutiny. This, and the fact that the monies were pooled between partners in a way that was not normal practice, required that project management had to be both rigorous and transparent to ensure that spend and activities were clearly accounted for and that risk assessments and contingency actions were considered continuously and engaged all partners. The Sussex project did this through a strong Project Board that met every 2-3 months, the appointment of an independent project management team, and by tailored use of a project management system (PRINCE 2). These were regarded by consultees as good practice lessons from the project. Had they been absent neither the parent departments nor the Treasury offered alternative management and monitoring systems. n Third, the high proportion of total costs funded by the ISB meant that the adoption of the project and the implementation of its findings by partner agencies in later years was not likely to be forcefully pursued unless further ISB funding was made available and/or the project was demonstrably so successful that the agencies would be prompted to change their spending priorities. For this reason, it was recognised by the Sussex project partners that they had to have a programme of dissemination activities and that a “benefits management strategy” should have been in place from the very beginning of the project to ensure that all partners were aware of the benefits and the actions necessary to realise them. 23. The Sussex project has addressed many of the above issues and, despite its setbacks, we hope that the project will continue to be endorsed by partner agencies and that its findings will be implemented. |
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