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REVIEW OF CIVIL PROCUREMENT
IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
PETER GERSHON
APRIL 1999
INTRODUCTION 
1. In November 1998 the Paymaster General and the Parliamentary Secretary
to the Cabinet Office invited me to review civil procurement in Central
Government in the light of the Government's objectives on efficiency,
modernisation and competitiveness in the short and medium term and
to report as soon as possible.
Following Ministerial changes that took place in December 1998,
the Chief Secretary to the Treasury became responsible for procurement
matters.
2. This Review was initiated following the Prime Minister's interest
in the report that the Ministerial Cabinet Committee on Public Expenditure
(PX) had commissioned in January 1998 and which was published in July
1998.
3. The term 'procurement' has many different interpretations. Throughout
this Review 'procurement' means the whole process of acquisition from
third parties (including the logistical aspects) and covers goods,
services and construction projects. This process spans the whole life
cycle from initial concept and definition of business needs through
to the end of the useful life of an asset or end of a services contract.
Both conventionally funded and more innovative types (e.g. PFI/PPP)
of funded projects are included. This definition is consistent with
modern supply chain management practices and that used in the 1995
White Paper (CM 2840) Setting New Standards.
The process is not limited to the purchasing function in
departments and is inherently multi-functional especially in large,
complex and / or novel procurements.
4. Total annual procurement spend in the civil Departments, their
Agencies and NDPBs is estimated to be in excess of £12.9 billion
at current prices. The scale and breadth of this level of expenditure
demands the highest levels of efficiency to achieve the best possible
value for money. In addition the composition of this expenditure has
been changing and will continue to change significantly through:
a) the Prime Minister's modernisation agenda including the focus
on outcomes and joined-up Government initiatives
b) the need to achieve value for money savings through better procurement
in order to release resources to support the key policy objectives
of the Government
c) the increasing use by Government of purchased services, e.g.
outsourced facilities management, provision of turn-key systems
and the use of third parties to deliver public services
5. My thanks are especially due to Martin Darcy from HM Treasury
and Janet Beach from the Court Service who gave me valuable assistance
throughout the Review and Carolyn Knight from HM Treasury for her
excellent administrative support. I am also grateful to all the organisations
and individuals who met with me or produced written submissions.
II. STRUCTURE & CONDUCT OF THE REVIEW
1. In order to address the very broad remit of this Review, I sought
inputs from a number of Government Departments, HM Treasury, the Cabinet
Office, the NAO, and a cross-section of suppliers to Government through
a combination of meetings and written submissions.
2. These inputs were structured around invited responses to 6 questions:
a) How important is procurement as an activity in civil government?
b) Is the structure and organisation of civil procurement activities
(e.g. Departmental, Treasury Procurement Group, CCTA, The Buying
Agency) efficient and effective?
c) Does the procurement function have the right level of skills
and capability to help achieve the Government's objectives on efficiency,
modernisation and competitiveness?
d) Can the Government make better use of its purchasing power
and collective expertise with suppliers e.g. through appropriate
aggregation of departmental requirements, to secure procurement
savings?
e) Are departments making full use of the flexibility, announced
in the Comprehensive Spending Review, to reinvest savings arising
from improving the efficiency of procurement?
f) What levels of savings are achievable through more efficient
and effective civil procurement?
3. Twenty meetings were held with Government officials, (including
nine involving Permanent Secretaries), nine meetings with senior executives
of suppliers to Government and one meeting with the CBI Industrial
Policy Group. Forty written submissions were received from various
Government Departments, Agencies and NDPBs. Twenty written submissions
came from industry.
4. In addition, a survey questionnaire was sent to 100 other suppliers
to Government and 28 replies were received.
5. The Review also took account of the three previous studies of
Government procurement that have been undertaken in this decade, namely:
-
Efficiency in Civil Government Procurement (the PX Report) -
July 1998
-
Setting New Standards: A Strategy for Government Procurement
(White Paper - CM 2840) - May 1995
-
Organisation of Procurement in Government Departments and their
Agencies March 1993
6. In order to determine the efficiency and effectiveness of the
current procurement arrangements, I considered the following seven
aspects:
to provide a comprehensive structure within which to analyse the
above inputs, identify the key findings and propose my recommendations.
III. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. POLICY
Findings
1. Decisions by previous Governments to decentralise and delegate
authority for procurement to Departments have been implemented without
establishing a common framework within which Departments must operate
to ensure coherence in how public money is spent.
2. Inputs from the supply base highlighted a lack of consistency
and common process, as well as a very wide spectrum between best
and worst practice in Government procurement. Two interviews with
industry illustrated that this spectrum exists even within the same
Agency of a Government Department.
3. The Review undertook a study of the electricity and gas prices
paid by Departments and benchmarked these against those paid by
a number of large private sector companies. This showed that the
lowest prices obtained by Departments were comparable to those secured
by best in class private sector organisations, but the highest prices
exceeded the lowest prices by 66% in the case of electricity and
140% in the case of gas.
This results from insufficient aggregation of requirements and
the consequent limitations on being able to take full advantage
of a competitive energy supply market.
4. 62% of the survey responses confirmed that different Departments
were applying different rules, policies and practices to the procurement
of essentially similar requirements.
5. Delegation to the maximum extent possible of what
is bought, is a management principle that brings great benefits.
It is also the case that organisations with best in class procurement
performance have recognised the need to mandate
some level of commonality of approach to procurement (not centralisation)
in order to secure such benefits as leverage with key suppliers,
maximum value for money from the aggregation of appropriate requirements
and facilitating the widespread use of best practice.
Recommendations
6. A common strategic framework should be established within which
all Departments will conduct their procurement activities in future.
This framework will include:
-
a standard procurement process (see C below)
-
common performance measures
-
key standards (e.g. for e-commerce)
-
common systems (e.g. for information about suppliers)
-
key values (e.g. a code of good customer practice, working
together across Departmental boundaries)
7. If a Department considers any part of this framework to be inappropriate
to its needs, then in order to act outside of the framework, up-front
agreement must be obtained from the proposed new central organisation
(see B below)
8. I recommend that this framework be approved by Cabinet or the
Public Services Expenditure Committee (PSX) so that it is seen to
have the necessary top level cross Departmental support.
B. ORGANISATION AND STRUCTURE
Findings
1. The issue of organisation and structure of the various activities
in the Cabinet Office and Treasury ('the Centre') was the one raised
most frequently in the submissions the Review received.
2. Central activities involved wholly, or having a significant
involvement, with procurement include:
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The Buying Agency (TBA) -Cabinet Office Executive Agency
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CCTA - Cabinet Office Executive Agency
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PACE - Cabinet Office Executive Agency
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COI - Cabinet Office Executive Agency
-
PFI Taskforce - HM Treasury
-
Procurement Group - HM Treasury
-
Wider Markets Team - HM Treasury
3. The fragmentation and lack of co-ordination of these activities
results in the Centre lacking the 'clout' necessary to lead Government
procurement into the 21st Century.
4. It was clear from many submissions that there is a widespread
recognition of the need for, and benefit of, a central body which
ensures consistency of policy, avoids re-invention of wheels, catalyses
appropriate aggregation and promotes best practice.
5. In general the input regarding these central activities, when
considered on an individual basis, ranged from neutral to positive,
with the concern being focussed on the overall lack of integration
and co-ordination.
6. However, TBA attracted a much broader spread of comments ranging
from strongly negative to very complimentary, and a number of inputs
queried the clarity and relevance of the role and mission of this
Agency.
7. There is no single person or body accountable for the deployment
of resources involved in central procurement activities and I consider
that these resources are being utilised in a sub-optimal manner
in terms of ensuring the best overall procurement performance by
Government.
8. This fragmentation and lack of co-ordination results in the
Centre having an unnecessarily limited 'value add' and not being
able to act as a strong catalyst in improving overall Government
procurement.
Recommendations
9. A single 'one-stop shop' procurement central organisation should
be created by combining as many of the resources of the above central
activities as is possible. As a minimum I recommend the activities
of:
-
Procurement Group
-
PFI Task force
-
TBA
-
PACE
-
CCTA
are included in this new central organisation,
which I have called Office of Government Commerce (OGC) throughout
the remainder of this report.
The key role and responsibilities of this new organisation are set
out in Annex 1.
10. Although the OGC will begin its life with a set of inherited
resources and activities, its role is not to maintain the
status quo. As the new organisation begins to focus on the
real high value added activities, I envisage that its inherited profile
of activities will change rapidly and this will require both the re-allocation
of existing resources and re-profiling of the OGC's skill base. An
initial injection of a small number of high calibre staff in order
to kick start the organisation will also be required.
11. At the same time as strengthening the effectiveness of the Centre,
I recommend an OGC Supervisory Board is established to help ensure
a coherent cross Departmental approach to procurement, and to provide
on-going top-level support and strategic direction to the OGC.
The Supervisory Board would be chaired by the Chief Secretary to
the Treasury (who would then be responsible for reporting to the Cabinet
and the Public Services Expenditure Committee on overall civil Government
procurement policy and performance).
I suggest membership of this Board includes:
-
a senior Cabinet Office representative (recognising this department's
continuing strategic interest in procurement)
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senior level official representation from the Treasury Public
Services Directorate
-
senior level official representation from a cross-section of
large and small departments
-
the Heads of Procurement from N. Ireland, Scotland and Wales
(to ensure that the benefits of a more coherent approach to procurement
are not lost as devolution occurs)
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one or two senior representatives from the private sector
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an observer from the National Audit Office
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the Chief Executive of the OGC
The proposed terms of reference of the Board are to:
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approve and monitor the business plan of the OGC
-
direct matters of public procurement policy and strategy, and
where appropriate, make recommendations to the Cabinet (or the
Public Services Expenditure Committee) in order to achieve consistent
cross Government procurement performance at best in class levels
-
take responsibility for approving targets and monitoring the
performance against these targets arising from improved procurement
across Government
-
act as a 'check and balance' between the OGC and individual
Departments
C. PROCESS
Findings
1. There is no well defined, common 'cradle to grave' process for
managing procurements which are large, complex, novel, or some combination
of these criteria. This puts important acquisitions of goods, services,
or construction projects - funded either conventionally or by other
means such as PFI - within, or across, Departments at unnecessary
risk as there is no common mechanism for strategically controlling
such procurements throughout their life cycle.
2. No common cross Departmental process exists for the management
of the supplier base.
3. Departments and some of the central functions are concerned
that some suppliers are currently enjoying differential pricing
because of the failure to co-ordinate the management of these suppliers.
4. A number of Government submissions recognised the advantages
to be gained from a common database of information about suppliers,
better understanding of the supply base's cost drivers and genuine
partnership relationships with industry.
5. Many industry submissions identified the benefits Government
would obtain from adopting a more 'private sector' approach to procurement
(allowing for the need to comply with European Community procurement
regime) especially in the area of customer - supplier relationships
based on a partnership approach.
6. A significant number of senior level Government inputs identified
concern about the potential level of dependence on a small number
of key suppliers in areas of strategic importance and the inability
to collectively identify this level of dependence without asking
the suppliers for the data.
Recommendations
7. A well defined, common process for the strategic management
of large, complex or novel (or some combination of these criteria)
procurements should be implemented based on the following principles:
-
projects have distinct phases in their life-cycle
-
the 'gates' between these phases can be characterised by sets
of deliverables (e.g. requirements specification, procurement
plan, project management plan, risk management plan)
-
deliverables should be assessed by people with relevant expertise
who are independent of the project
-
important 'gates' (typically 3 in the life cycle) can only
be passed as a result of successful reviews chaired by senior
people who have no vested interest in the outcome of the review.
An example of the main elements of a generic procurement process
is illustrated in Annex 2.
When a review is not successful the review chairman should bring
the matter to the attention of the relevant Departmental Permanent
Secretary and the Chief Executive of the OGC who will need to agree
the action to be taken.
8. The detailed definition of this process, including the required
deliverables at each gate, should be led by the OGC who will take
into account external best practice and the experience gained from
both recent successes and failures in Government procurement of
large, complex, or novel projects.
9. Such a process will:
-
help to ensure a more consistent and enhanced level of performance
on project orientated procurements, thereby saving money and
boosting efficiency
-
catalyse widespread use of best practice, as this will increasingly
be documented in the definition of the deliverables
-
provide a foundation for procurements which support joined-up
Government initiatives
10. The OGC should develop a common process for the management
of the supplier base, with top priority being given to those suppliers
who are involved in the provision of goods and services which are
critical to the successful operation of Government. Such a process
must be firmly based on measurable data. It should also define the
role of the OGC in the management of the overall relationship with
suppliers and the role of Departments in managing individual project
based relationships with suppliers.
D. MEASUREMENT
Findings
1. There are no common systems across Government for:
-
recording what is purchased, the associated prices and sources
of supply
-
analysing the true costs of procurement transactions
-
rating the capability and performance of suppliers
-
targeting and measuring year on year value for money improvements
from the procurement function
2. Good common measurement systems are an essential component of any
procurement system which aspires to be best in class. The complete
absence of any such systems is the finding that gave me the greatest
concern during the course of this Review.
3. One Department told me that the level of savings from improved
procurement is difficult to gauge and admitted that there was only
a hazy idea on how much was spent and no clear data on what was
bought. Another Departmental input indicated that there was a general
understanding of how much had been spent, but the IT systems and
purchasing classifications were not sufficiently strong to identify
what had been bought.
4. The only area where the Review obtained comparable data on a
like for like basis was in the area of electricity and gas supply.
Reference has already been made in III A.3 to the results of the
analysis. If the Department that paid the highest rate for electricity
had the benefit of the lowest rate in Government the saving would
amount to almost £2.5m per annum.
5. Without visibility of the true costs of procurement transactions
the management appetite for e-commerce is substantially diminished;
the speed of take-up of the Government Procurement Card is symptomatic
of this. It is a cause for concern that those aspects of the Prime
Minister's modernisation agenda, dependent on the widespread adoption
of e-commerce in Government procurement, are at risk.
6. During discussions with Departments it became clear that in
some instances comparisons of prices obtained by CCTA and TBA under
framework agreements are not being undertaken on a like for like
basis. Some Departments appear to regard the overhead costs incurred
in undertaking their own procurements as sunk costs while the prices
offered to them by these Agencies include the associated transaction
costs.
7. The absence of a common system for rating the capability and
performance of suppliers results both in unnecessary duplication
of effort in Government and the supply base, and contributes to
the overall sub-optimal management of suppliers.
8. The absence of a common system for targeting and measuring value
for money improvements from procurement (both cost reduction and
cost avoidance) means that senior management lacks an essential
best in class tool for the strategic management of procurement activities.
9. Overall the weakness in the measurement area disadvantages Government
because there is a lack of data; this inhibits informed decision
making on many procurement matters. Objective inter-Departmental
and external price-tracking are not currently an integral part of
procurement management.
Recommendations
10. The OGC should define, in conjunction with Departments, common
ways of recording what is bought, the associated prices and sources
of supply. Departments will then need to modify or upgrade their
purchasing systems accordingly. Such actions will include the consistent
implementation across Departments of a common coding system. Examples
include the National Supplier Vocabulary that was referred to in
the 1998 PX Report, or the Common Procurement Vocabulary currently
being recommended by the European Commission.
11. Departments must implement systems to ensure that the true
costs of procurement transactions can be measured. The adoption
of Resource Accounting should assist in this area.
12. The OGC should identify certain common types of transaction
which have a high cost to Government either as a result of the volume
or complexity of such transactions, and work with Departments to
help reduce these costs through techniques such as
e-commerce and procurement cards.
13. The OGC should work with Departments to produce a common system
for rating the capability and performance of suppliers. Wherever
possible capability measurement should be based on recognised external
benchmarks (e.g the Business Excellence Model). Performance ratings
should be based on objective measurement of recent track record
on Government contracts where these exist.
14. A common system for measuring value for money improvements
(i.e. both cost reduction and cost avoidance) must be developed
by the OGC. The General Guidance on Targets and Savings issued in
May 1994 may provide a useful starting point.
The system must not impose a heavy data collection burden on Departments.
E. PEOPLE
Findings
1. Although there are some very talented and capable people within
the Government Procurement Service that is now being established,
I concluded that the overall levels of skill, capability and seniority
need to be raised significantly.
2. With some notable exceptions the function lacks the necessary
'clout' and influence to fully meet both the current and future
challenges of Government procurement.
3. The mechanisms for planning the new procurement skills required
to support new policies and initiatives such as joined-up Government
are too weak, resulting in ad-hoc approaches to new challenges and
excessive dependency on expensive external consultants.
4. During a number of meetings with Departmental Heads of Procurement
it became clear that there is too much focus by procurement staff
on low value commodity items and insufficient involvement in business
critical procurements e.g. outsourcing and PFI contracts, where
qualified personnel could add the greatest value.
5. The most recent survey of procurement staff showed that in 1997,
the procurement function in government lost 17% of its staff - almost
all of these were qualified. Since 71% of these left within 12 months
of qualifying, there is evidence to suggest that the better staff
use their qualifications in order to find more attractive jobs in
the private sector. There is little to suggest that this very serious
situation has improved.
6. Another Department's input identified that having the right
skills was necessary but not sufficient; ensuring those with the
skills are in a position to exercise influence is also key. This
is a function of the seniority and leadership skills of Departmental
Heads of Procurement who in general do not report directly to their
Permanent Secretaries.
7. Industry also expressed a concern that in some Departments too
many matters related to high value procurements were delegated by
senior officials to junior staff.
Recommendations
8. The proposed OGC should be run by a Chief Executive at Permanent
Secretary or equivalent level.
9. In Departments with large procurement expenditures the Head
of Procurement should be a Grade 3 or equivalent level appointment,
reporting wherever possible direct to the Departmental Permanent
Secretary. Such appointments will require the approval of both the
Departmental Permanent Secretary and the OGC Chief Executive in
addition to any other approvals that may be required. Equivalent
arrangements should be implemented in Agencies and NDPBs with large
procurement expenditures.
10. A strong planning function needs to be implemented within the
OGC so that procurement skills required to support new Government
policies and initiatives can be developed in good time.
11. The actions related to staff development in the 1998 PX Report
need to be updated in the light of progress to date and vigorously
reinforced by the OGC. In particular the actions related to the
% of the Government Procurement Service in designated posts having
a graduate level procurement qualification require urgent attention.
As a matter of high priority, the OGC should identify causes for
the current difficulties in the recruitment, motivation and retention
of professionally qualified procurement staff and should put in
place an action plan to reverse the situation.
12. Departmental procurement skills and capabilities will be an
important feature of the proposed periodic reviews between OGC and
Departments. I would expect these to sustain pressure on continuing
to raise the level of professional knowledge, skills and seniority
of procurement staff. Over time the implementation of this and other
recommendations (e.g. the creation of a favourable environment for
the widespread adoption of e-commerce) will lead to a smaller, more
skilled, better paid and motivated procurement function across Government.
13. Where a Department (or Agency or NDPB) is unable to justify
an appropriately skilled and managed procurement function, an action
plan must be agreed with the OGC on how procurement matters will
be managed.
F. SUPPLY BASE
Findings
1. There was widespread agreement that UK Government procurement
is fair and open, and compares well with other countries.
2. Tendering to Government is burdensome and costly to suppliers.
Inputs from industry indicated that bidding for Government contracts
is typically 10 - 50% more costly than bidding for comparable projects
in the private sector with the key drivers of these cost burdens
being the greater level of detail required and more extended time
scales.
3. A number of industry inputs highlighted that the magnitude of
these costs is deterring potential bidders from competing. Some
bidders try to recover the cost of lost tenders in new bids for
Government contracts.
4. Industry submissions also referred to the scope of innovative
proposals being limited when Departmental requirements were prescriptive
in how they were to be met, rather than describing the required
output and performance levels to be achieved.
5. Despite declared Government procurement policy being based on
value for money rather than lowest initial cost, many inputs from
industry highlighted a perception that the culture of the Civil
Service is risk averse and the 'safe' option is justifying the lowest
up front cost. While Invitations to Tender do usually specify the
value for money criteria, it does not appear to be standard practice
even to specify the relative priority and weightings of the different
criteria.
6. Communication between the Centre and Departments was perceived
to be weak, leading to key policies such as value for money being
interpreted in different ways.
7. Many industry inputs identified that Government's behaviour
as a customer is not consistently seen as best in class and that
the gap between the best and worst procurement behaviour across,
and sometimes within, Departments is very wide.
Recommendations
8 Within the bounds permitted by European Community procurement
regime, Departments need to be more sensitive to the burdens which
their procurement procedures place on suppliers. The OGC should
consult with industry to identify common causes of these burdens
and take appropriate action with Departments.
9. In some sectors of supply the OGC needs to determine whether
the base of suppliers is broad enough to maintain competition and
innovation and take appropriate action through Government and Departmental
initiatives to stimulate the interest of potential suppliers.
10. The above two recommendations may also provide a useful opportunity
for a renewed impetus to attract more SMEs to bid for Government
contracts.
11. In major purchases covered by the proposed common procurement
process, I recommend that the procurement strategy takes into account
the estimated total costs that will be borne by industry in bidding
for the contract as well as the total costs to be borne by the Department.
12. Invitations to tender should provide a prioritised list together
with an indication of the relative weightings of the value for money
criteria that will be used in the evaluation process.
G. IMPLEMENTATION
Findings
1. Many of the findings of this Review have been identified in at
least one of the three previous studies on procurement published since
1993. Despite these studies identifying many sensible recommendations
and policies, I concluded that both properly resourced implementation
plans and the necessary top level commitment have been lacking.
2. Fundamental reform of procurement systems in any large organisation
requires a well resourced approach which is coherent and sustained
over a number of years and which is visibly and consistently supported
by top management.
3. I could find no evidence that such an approach had been put in
place following earlier studies and it is therefore not particularly
surprising that there is a very broad spectrum of procurement performance
across Government and many earlier sensible recommendations have failed
to realise their full potential.
Recommendations
4. It is essential that dedicated resources are allocated in the
OGC to ensure that there is the sustained impetus to secure the
necessary step change in procurement performance. This change is
both achievable and essential to help meet the Government's objectives
in competitiveness, efficiency and modernisation.
5. In the first year of operation of the OGC, I estimate that a
small number of additional high calibre people will need to be added
to the cost base. As the OGC integrates its inherited activities
and focuses on the high value-added opportunities, I believe these
additional people can be funded from within the inherited cost base
after the first year of operation.
IV. FINANCIAL BENEFITS
1. As stated earlier, it has proved very difficult to obtain accurate
information about the detailed nature of the annual procurement spend
in the Departments covered by this Review due to the absence of essential
common measurement systems. In addition, there are significant internal
and external (e.g consultants) costs borne by Government in the management
and implementation of its procurements.
2. However it is clear, both from Government and Industry inputs,
that the current position is far from optimal and there is substantial
scope to achieve significant value for money improvements, comprising
both cost reductions and cost avoidance, through reforms of the current
procurement arrangements.
3. I therefore recommend that an overall value for money improvement
target of £1billion is set for achievement by the end 2001/2
Fiscal Year. While this is aspirational, I believe it contains a sensible
degree of challenge which can be achieved through focussed and determined
effort supported by the right leadership.
V. PROPOSED TIME SCALES
1. APRIL - OCTOBER 1999
Ministerial approval of this review
Initial communications campaign - Press Conference
- Supplier Conference
- Departmental 'Roadshow'
Consultation - Officials
- Industry
- Other stakeholders
Recruitment process for OGC Chief Executive
Identify the causes of the high attrition rate for procurement staff
and develop an action plan.
Preparation of initial OGC business plan and 2000 /01 budget
2. 1st OCTOBER 1999
Establish OGC and its Supervisory Board
3. OCTOBER 1999 - APRIL 2000
Develop the standard procurement process
Define common performance measures and interim arrangements for
obtaining the relevant data.
Set the initial key standards
Establish the key values of Government procurement (e.g. code of
good customer practice)
Develop model for measuring value for money improvements from improved
procurement performances
Identify and set value for money improvements, by type of supply
and Department, in order to achieve the £1billion target
Identify the areas where the OGC should undertake aggregated procurement
Develop process for management of the supplier base and common system
for rating suppliers
Re-profiling of the senior procurement post to Grade 3 or equivalent
level in appropriate Departments, Agencies and NDPBs
Development of generic transaction cost models
4. APRIL 2000
OGC fully operational and effective
Ministerial approval of the common strategic framework
75% of members of the Government Procurement Service to be professionally
qualified
At least 3 new agreements negotiated for aggregated requirements
which give
substantial (10%+) savings over current arrangements
5. OCTOBER 2000
Report to PSX Committee to detail progress to date and update on
action in hand in order to achieve value for money improvements of
£1billion by 2002.
6. OCTOBER 2001
Ministerial approval of OGC proposals for value for money improvements
in the period April 2002 to March 2005.
7. APRIL 2002
OGC able to demonstrate to Ministers that the £1billion target
has been achieved.
PETER GERSHON
21 APRIL 1999
ANNEX 1
ROLE & RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PROPOSED
OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT COMMERCE
-
Formulation of integrated procurement policy and strategy
-
Represent UK on procurement matters in EU, WTO and other relevant
international bodies
-
Ownership of the generic procurement process
-
Development of a common process for management of the supplier
base
-
Strategic management of key suppliers, especially those involved
in providing goods and services which are critical to the successful
operation of Government
-
Measurement and benchmarking of procurement performance across
Government
-
Specifying e-commerce standards and sponsoring the development
of products which facilitate their implementation across Government
-
Undertaking procurement on behalf of Government where aggregation
of requirements enables significant value for money improvements
to be obtained
-
Provision of a centre of excellence for strategic procurement
skills e.g. PFI, outsourcing and the management of very large
complex projects in areas such as IT and construction
-
Planning for, and development of, new procurement skills
-
Undertaking periodic procurement reviews of procurement performance,
skills and capabilities with Departments
-
Catalysing the spread of best in class procurement practice
-
Functional leadership of the Government Procurement Service
-
Working pro-actively with Departments to implement the recommendations
of this Review
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